The application of scenario planning to internally generated e-government futures by Burt, George et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Burt, George, Cairns, George, van der Heijden, Kees, & Wright, George
(2001)
The application of scenario planning to internally generated e-government
futures.
Strathclyde Graduate Business School, Glasgow.
[Working Paper]
This file was downloaded from: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/102065/
c© Copyright 2001 [Please consult the author]
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
 1 
electronic submission ID no: 10207 
 
 
 
 
 
The application of scenario planning to internally generated e-government 
futures 
George Burt, Dr George Cairns (contact) 
Prof. Kees van der Heijden, Prof. George Wright 
Centre for Scenario Planning and Future Studies 
Graduate School of Business 
University of Strathclyde 
199 Cathedral Street 
GLASGOW G4 0QY 
UK 
e-mail: cairns@gsb.strath.ac.uk (contact) 
burt@gsb.strath.ac.uk; kees@gbn.org; wright@gsb.strath.ac.uk 
tel: +44 141 553 6066 
fax: +44 141 552 8851 
 2 
electronic submission ID no: 10207 
The application of scenario planning to internally generated e-government futures 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to critical discussion on the contribution of external agents to change and 
development programs.  We present empirical evidence of externally facilitated change to 
mindsets and patterns of behavior within local government through use of a scenario planning 
based approach.  The project examined the impact of information and communications 
technologies (ICT) on government departments/agencies.  Our aim was to facilitate the 
organizational actors conduct of investigation of the ‘limits of the possible’ for a range of 
plausible futures, and determination of strategic responses to these.  Participants used their own 
current knowledge and understanding as a basis for development, with the introduction of 
external ‘expertise’ to challenge their thinking and to expand their understanding.  Following 
this, we facilitated the participants’ elucidation of key uncertainties on the future, exploration of 
the relationships between them and possible outcomes.  The participants then constructed 
scenarios that outlined four possible and plausible futures.  The specific intent was that the 
scenarios must hold explicit meaning for the participants, and enable them to identify 
implications of each possible future in relation to structure and service requirements.  These were 
used to inform analysis of current structure, service, etc.  We argue that the external facilitation of 
internal generation of knowledge, understanding and meaning, and of exploration of the limits of 
the possible for the future, is a valuable tool for decision support and comprehending strategic 
choices.  It enables organizational actors to make sense of complexities and ambiguities that they 
face in their day-to-day business within a wider business framework. 
Keywords:- e-government, scenarios, futures 
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In this paper, we seek to contribute to discussion on the role and contribution of external agents 
to origination and design of organizational change.  We describe and discuss our use of scenario 
planning as a tool for facilitating change, with reference to the limited amount of critical 
academic literature on scenario planning, and with specific critical comparison with decision 
analysis and unstructured group process.  We do this within the context of government, in the 
debate on the future role of government and the means by which it might deliver value-based 
services to its citizenry through the application of new information and communications 
technologies (ICT).  Based upon our own experience, and by reference to the literature, we 
discuss external facilitation of change programs such that they have meaning for, and become 
embedded in the consciousness and sub-consciousness of organizational actors. 
 
We present evidence of empirical study of our work with a local government organization in the 
UK (here referred to as Northshire Council) in which our role was that of facilitators of 
investigation by the elected members and salaried officers of the Council, and members of their 
partner organizations from the public and not-for-profit sectors.  The project was set up in 
response to a call for submissions for funding from a section of central government under a 
program entitled ‘Modernizing Government’, concerned with the application of new ICT in 
support of ‘joined up government’, with the aim of making government more efficient and 
effective.  At the time of our intervention, Northshire Council had been invited to revise their first 
round submission for a second round, but had received critical feedback on the lack of clear 
strategic direction and deliverables within their submission.  The primary method applied in the 
intervention was one of scenario planning (van der Heijden, 1996), with the key aim that the 
Council members and officers should develop their own broad understanding of the range of 
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possibilities for the future environment in which they may find themselves operating.  Also, that 
their strategic thinking should be outward focused, towards the community and its desires, 
aspirations, service needs, etc., rather than inward focused on the Council’s own intentions, 
capabilities, and service offerings. 
 
Whilst the investigation, analysis and critical appraisal were undertaken by the group actors 
themselves, they received input on the possibilities of technology, governance and other areas 
from ‘remarkable people’ (van der Heijden, 1996), selected not for their knowledge of 
Northshire, and not to offer any ‘solutions’.  Rather, they offered general insights into the ‘limits 
of the possible’ for futures in and around their area of expertise in order to broaden the range of 
thinking of the internal participants. 
 
As external agents in the design of Northshire Council’s change agenda, our aims were fivefold, 
seeking to facilitate the members and officers’ own:- 
• elucidation of key uncertainties on the future 
• investigation of the ‘limits of the possible’ 
• exploration of the relationships between these and possible outcomes 
• articulation of a range of plausible futures 
• determination of strategic responses 
In so doing, we sought to combine the positive elements of intellectual ownership by the Council 
through personal involvement, along with added surprise and learning value through external 
input (Schoemaker, 1995). 
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Our study indicates that the creation of ‘short histories of the future’ by the group through their 
own creative and critical engagement with their developing understanding, was a powerful force 
for change in the mindset and intent of the Council.  It enabled members and officers to 
comprehend the strategic options that were open to them in terms of the impact that these would 
have on the community, its responses, and, ultimately, on themselves. 
 
Whilst acknowledging the context-specific nature of the work, and its current limitations in terms 
of elapsed time, we seek to draw out some general points of interest for discussion of the nature 
of change, the role of external agents, and the application of scenario planning. 
 
Change and the public sector 
 
Since the 1980’s, the UK has seen a continuous paradigm shift in public sector management, 
under both Conservative and Labour governments, from the ‘traditional’ model of public sector , 
characterized by lack of market incentives and higher levels of bureaucratic rule and regulation 
than in private sector organizations (Meyer, 1982).  Successive governments have sought to 
establish an approach and a new management ethos that places emphasis on responsiveness to 
consumers, improved performance, and revenue generation in line with the new public 
management vocabulary (Maor, 1999) and the drive towards debureaucratization (Savoie, 1994).  
At the beginning of this period of change, the relationship of public/private sector management 
might have been viewed as dichotomous in terms of concern for, and comfort with 
stability/change, cost/revenue, bureaucracy/entrepreneurship (Rainey, 1983).  Research in the 
1990’s showed that this was no longer the case (Bozeman and Bretschneider, 1994), and that the 
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value systems of the public sector was migrating towards that of the private sector.  Much of this 
change towards a private sector ethos has been driven through the involvement of the private 
sector, partly through programs of privatization of public sector services and utilities, and partly 
through the involvement of private sector management consultants as change agents in the public 
sector.  Where the external agents’ role is that of deliverer of solutions to organizational 
problems, it might be characterized as ‘heroic’ (Kanter, 1989), providing deliverance that could 
not be internally conceived.  In meeting the aims of the Modernizing Government program, to 
apply new ICT, there is strong temptation to move directly to seeking external solutions, since 
leading edge thinking on the new technologies obviously lies within the private sector.  
Northshire Council themselves and we as external agents were not, however, open to 
consideration of externally generated solutions through application of the ‘expert systems’ model 
of decision making (Cairns and Beech, 1999).  Rather, all parties sought to enable internally 
generated solutions based upon a ‘knowledge-centered’ (Cairns and Beech, 1999) approach and 
consideration of the widest possible range of options. 
 
Scenarios and the search for unity 
 
Many of the models for organizational change that might be considered applicable to a program 
of public/private sector convergence are embedded in modernist thinking, in search of unitary 
forms of organization.  Such unifying approaches are presented in much of the managerial 
literature, as in the search for coherence (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991), shared vision (Collins and 
Porras, 1996; Wack, 1985), strong and unifying leadership (Bass, 1985) and an integrated 
organizational culture (Martin, 1992).  In its execution in the practice arena, such rationalist 
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thinking undertaken in search of the causa finalis (Nietzsche, 1968) - the final cause or purpose 
of human endeavor – is frequently based upon selection and exclusion.  Rather than promoting 
divergence and exploration of multiple possible causal relationships, organizational actors seek 
the most plausible and acceptable explanation to any problem.  They seek firstly to dispel any 
notions of the unfamiliar, the un-experienced, the uncomfortable (Nietzsche, 1994), then to select 
only what is new and comfortable; those things for which they can create false similarities 
(Nietzsche, 1986) with what is already known and familiar.  In reality, however, it is often the 
alien and the un-experienced that will have greatest impact upon organizations, such as the reality 
that there is a world market for more than 5 computers, that there is a reason for individuals to 
have a computer in their home (Schoemaker, 1995)! 
 
In contrast to the rationalist, modernist and reductive approach, the nihilist postmodernist may 
support the conclusion that all cause is deception, all effects ‘super-added’ by human 
interpretation (Nietzsche, 1968).  Here, there is no unity, no single reality, and no causal 
relationship in human action.  Whilst we argue against the concept of a single reality and unitary 
thinking, we consider that fragmented nihilist approaches are of little significance to those in the 
practice arena - those seeking meaning from, and for their day-to-day activities.  For them, what 
is required is a way of getting to grips with the causa efficiens (Nietzsche, 1968) - the efficient 
cause – that might offer meaningful interpretation of managerial thinking/acting.  In our scenario 
based approach, we argue for thinking which is divergent and non-linear, not seeking reduction 
of complexity and ambiguity to a false unity, as in the averaging approach to synthesizing 
divergent opinions in decision analysis (Wright and Goodwin, 1999).  Neither do we seek 
abandonment of all notion of cause and effect, no matter how perceptual.  Rather, we seek 
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integration of diverse and contradictory concepts into a range of plausible scenario story lines; to 
seek the causae efficiens – the efficient causes – that will enable individuals and organizations to 
be proactively prepared for any reasonably possible and plausible future. 
 
Whereas decision analysis will apply the probability laws in order to police and to devalue the 
‘conjunction fallacies’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) by which humans make sense of the 
events and decisions that they face, scenario planning applies plausibility perceptions to use these 
fallacies.  This is not done, as Mintzberg suggests (Hyde, 1999) in order that ‘by speculating 
upon a variety (of futures), you might just hit upon the right one’, but to frame the limits of 
possibility for a range of plausible futures.  This is done with the belief that, barring the 
unknowable happening, the ‘real’ future will fall somewhere within the established frame.  We 
believe that it is better to be proactively prepared for any reasonable eventuality than to be even 
the fastest at reacting to emergent reality. 
 
In accepting that much of what underpins scenarios is assumption, we see this as a strength, 
rather than as the weakness claimed by Mintzberg (Hyde, 1999).  We see scenarios as a tool to 
facilitate understanding of the multiple ‘realities’ that are generated by actors in their own 
individual and shared context(s) of thinking/acting, and to investigate the reasoning and logic that 
underpins these socially constructed realities (Berger and Luckman, 1966).  We argue for 
proactive internal ‘problem seeking’ and conceptualization of options as a means of overcoming 
adoption of the ‘defensive routines’ (Argyris, 1985) that stand in the way of implementation of 
externally generated solutions.  Also, we argue for the application of the scenario approach as an 
iterative and proactive form of vigilance in the search for future problems, as proactive antidote 
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to the negative outcomes of unstructured group process or unsuccessful decision analysis, 
characterized by ‘defensive avoidance’ or ‘hyper-vigilance’ (Janis and Mann, 1977). 
 
Method 
 
In adopting an organization-centered approach to problem framing, analysis and strategic 
thinking, we consider it necessary that the exercise be firmly embedded in the organization 
members’ own context of thinking/acting.  However, our experience is that the pre-existent 
boundaries of that context may result in initial definition of a narrow set of problem defining 
parameters by the organization.  These can place inhibiting constraints upon action, framing the 
problem at a largely operational level rather than enabling wide ranging, innovative and 
challenging investigation at the conceptual level.  For example, in decision analysis practice there 
is nothing inherent in the methodology to challenge the decision-makers’ a priori worldview of 
the course of unfolding events in the external world.  It is against this worldview that decision 
options are generated and evaluated in decision analysis practice (Wright and Goodwin, 1999).  
We seek to broaden the scope of the organizational members’ thinking, re-framing their 
worldview, whilst ensuring that it remains their worldview, rather than that of the external 
change agents.  Throughout the intervention process, therefore, our concentration is upon 
listening rather than speaking, facilitating rather than directing, questioning rather than 
answering. 
 
In seeking to facilitate the organizational participants’ explorations of the limits of the possible, 
the major element of the method applied to the empirical study was that of scenario planning 
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(Wack, 1985; Schwartz, 1991; Schoemaker and van der Heijden, 1992; Schoemaker, 1995; van 
der Heijden, 1996).  By this method, we sought to elicit the participants’ – both elected members 
and officers from Northshire, and members of their partner organizations from the public and not 
for profit sectors – perceptions of the critical uncertainties (Schoemaker, 1995) that the Council 
might face in the next 5 years, and to explore their impact upon society and the Council’s 
operations within a range of differentiated, but plausible futures.  The use of scenarios enables 
management of complexity and ambiguity without reduction and elimination.   
 
In order to determine a meaningful organizational context for the scenario exercise, we first 
conducted a series of 25 in-depth, semi-structured but open-ended interviews with 4 elected 
members and 11 senior officers of Northshire Council, and with 10 members of partner 
organizations.  Each of these interviews lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours, and was designed to 
facilitate the interviewees thinking firstly about the broadest of issues in the external macro-
environment, with a concentration upon those factors that were considered to be of major 
relevance to the future sphere of operations of the Council.  Then, discussion was moved towards 
consideration of the internal, micro-environmental factors that related to these macro-elements.  
Thereafter, interviewees were invited to consider the recent history of the Council, and how the 
current status of the micro-environment was derived.  Finally, the interview was thrown open to 
the interviewees to add any further material they considered relevant to the study.  By this means, 
we sought to inspire the interviewees thinking firstly about the future of the world beyond the 
Council, then on how this would impact upon the Council, and finally to consider the Council’s 
own legacy systems to the present time.  From this process, we derived insights into the issues 
that were seen to be of concern to all the interviewees in relation to the future of Northshire 
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Council.  Also, we were able to attune the participants’ thinking to the concept of looking from 
the outside in, and from the future back to the present; a major element of the scenario thinking 
process. 
 
We sought to share the content of the interviews with all participants, but with the content being 
non-attributable to individuals, and with some structure that would assist assimilation.  The 
interview transcript report was structured around a number of general but common themes, 
determined by us but derived directly from the content of the interviewees’ own words.  This 
report of the interview content was then used as an agenda for a workshop, working with the 
Council’s own ‘scenario team’, consisting of 6 members derived of the elected members and 
senior officers.  Our role in the workshop was to facilitate the critical engagement of the team 
with the interview material, to enable and support their own ‘strategic conversation’ (van der 
Heijden, 1996) in order to seek to identify the critical uncertainties faced by the Council over the 
next 5 years, from which to derive the framework for the scenario construction.  This framework 
was therefore derived of the participants’ own thinking on issues, and their personal involvement 
in the process.  This was done in order that they might have intellectual ownership of, and belief 
in the credibility of the content of the resultant scenarios (Schoemaker, 1995).  At the same time, 
our role as facilitators was designed to minimize the risk of organizational bias and suppression 
of new ideas, and to maximize learning opportunities from innovative external inputs 
(Schoemaker, 1995). 
 
Having derived a scenario framework from the set of 25 interviews, but working with the smaller 
group of 6 in order to concentrate upon critical discussion of underlying themes, issues, 
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uncertainties, etc., we facilitated a second, scenario building workshop with the original 25 
interviewees.  Return to the larger group here was intended to maximize involvement in 
development and ownership of the scenarios.  In line with most scenario planning approaches 
(Schwartz, 1991; Schoemaker and van der Heijden, 1992; Schoemaker, 1995; van der Heijden, 
1996) the process involved initial investigation of the driving forces that will impact upon the 
future, those with outcomes that are largely predetermined and those that are uncertain.  In the 
former category fall areas of demographics – most of the Councils’ future ‘customers’ may 
already be identified and understood – and areas of technological development.  In to the latter 
category fall areas of technology adoption and application, and matters of partisan political 
dogma.  For those driving forces that are considered uncertain in outcome, the participants define 
in a few words the two polar extreme outcomes that are considered feasible within the scenario 
timeframe.  Since the determination of driving forces and outcomes in a large scale scenario 
exercise can lead to the surfacing of hundreds of ideas, the next stage is one, not of selection of 
ideas, but of clustering and determining relatedness, in order to bring manageability without 
reduction and elimination.  It is with the cluster headings – the encapsulating titles that describe a 
discrete, although not independent, and complex sub-set of the worldview – that the participants 
initially work in determining the overall scenario outlines. 
 
The particular scenario approach adopted (van der Heijden, 1996) differs from the ‘simple 
scenario’ approach (Schoemaker, 1995) in that it does not seek to combine different driving 
force, or groups of driving forces outcomes in terms of positive, negative or stable combinations 
relative to the current strategic position.  In the adopted approach, the structure of the scenarios 
within the general framework of investigation is based upon identification of the 2 critical 
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uncertainty areas, that exist independently of each other, and that are considered to have the 
greatest perceived impact upon the organization.  These are then set out in the four possible 
combinations – in simplistic terms, best/best, worst/worst, best/worst and worst/best - in order to 
establish a scenario matrix.  The participants then seek to place all the driving force outcomes 
into one or more of the scenario outlines, based upon consideration of the internal logic, the 
causal and chronological relationships, and the conjunction fallacies (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1983) that link them.  The range of plausible outcomes that derives from this approach enables 
exploration of the combination of positive and negative forces in order to produce entirely 
plausible, but unexpected outcomes. 
 
Findings from the scenario exercise 
 
From the initial set of 25 in-depth interviews, we determined a vast range of issues that 
concerned the individuals.  We first sought to present the results of these interviews back to the 
participants, with anonymity and set within a general structure of recurring themes identified by 
ourselves, but derived entirely from the transcript material.  These themes were the external 
environment, the role of the Council, values of Northshire Council, forms of organization, the 
change project itself, issues relevant to other agencies, and funding.  This structure around 
themes was intended to bring manageability to the data, to seek a focus upon the critical 
uncertainties, but without reduction and elimination of issues deemed to be relevant through 
inclusion in the interview discussion.  The interview content was thus reported back to the 
interviewees and, having obtained confirmation that the content of the interview record was 
recognized by the participants as making sense in their own context of thinking/acting, the first 
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workshop was held with the Council’s own scenario team.  This was used as a forum for 
determining a scenario framework to serve as an agenda for a subsequent scenario workshop with 
the larger group of members, officers, and partner organization representatives who had 
participated in the interviews.  This scenario framework was derived of 9 uncertainty clusters 
agreed by the participants in this first workshop, that included:- 
• partner agendas – whether partner organizations shared the values of the Council, the 
commitment to involvement, willingness to share resources, etc. 
• information mapping and understanding the basics of the business – how do current systems 
relate to knowledge management, can duplicate systems be integrated/eliminated, etc. 
• public ownership – is the commitment to involvement a solution or an ideology, will the 
public be with the Council, how does it relate to cultures of youth and the underclasses, will 
participation be hijacked by pressure groups, etc. 
• central agencies as help or hindrance – what is the real agenda of central government, does 
system centralization conflict with democracy, etc. 
• also, what will be the opportunities and constraints offered by new technologies, what 
resource implications are there for the change process, what will be the macro-economic 
factors of relevance, how will change be managed, and what will be the new organizational 
design required to implement joined up government in the future. 
From these nine clusters, a ‘broad canvas’ for the subsequent scenario workshop was defined 
around four themes of:- 
• technology possibilities 
• citizen views of technology solutions, and societal acceptance/rejection 
• knowledge management, joined up government, and complexity 
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• governance and democracy in the future 
 
Prior to the scenario workshop, further input to the participants’ expanding frame of thinking was 
gained by the invitation of a small number of external experts – ‘remarkable people’ (van der 
Heijden, 1996) – to present views on the ‘limits of the possible’ for the future of information and 
communications technologies (ICT), their application to public sector management, and the 
nature of governance and society.  The scenario workshop was structured around our facilitation 
of the participants’ initial identification of the widest possible range of driving forces for change 
over the next 5 years.  This was an open-ended process, in that no time limit was placed upon it, 
and it was conducted initially in round robin format, such that all 25 members provided input in 
turn until each ran out of ideas.  Over a period of some 90 minutes, over 120 driving forces were 
identified by individuals and clarified by the group in terms of the plausible polar outcomes for 
the Council’s operations.  These were recorded on magnetic hexagons on large wall-mounted 
boards, so that the entire group could share the content, and the process of manipulation of ideas 
without intervention by us, or without any individual member of the group constraining the 
thinking according to their own agenda.  The driving forces were clustered by the participants as 
a group through a process of manipulation of the hexagons, accompanied by open discussion, 
argument, negotiation and compromise, again with the aims of investigating perceived causal 
relationships, and obtaining a manageable number of concepts without reduction.  The resulting 
nine clusters were given encapsulating titles by the participants.  These cluster headings were 
then ranked firstly according to the relative impact they were considered likely to have on the 
Council, and the perceived relative degree of uncertainty as to what the outcomes of this impact 
might be over the next 5 years. 
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In accordance with the adopted scenario approach (van der Heijden, 1996), the scenario 
dimensions were derived of those two cluster groupings that, whilst not directly driving each 
other, were considered to have the combination of greatest impact, with highest degree of 
uncertainty as to the outcomes.  These cluster groupings related to the fields of:- 
• the democratic process – primarily concerned with the balance between central and local 
government, and the effect of the balance struck between these upon delivery of services at 
the local level by the Council 
• value creation – concerned with the speed of development of new technologies, the capacity 
for individuals and organizations to internalize these, and the their use to become more 
productive 
In relation to the democratic process, the participants saw uncertainty as to whether decision 
making would rest with individuals and with businesses, with minimum intervention from 
government and the public sector agencies, or whether society would move towards a 
collectivism in which community issues would come to the fore.  In relation to value creation 
from new technologies, there was uncertainty as to whether technology would be adapted to 
human needs, unleashing a new productivity through unimpeded uptake, or whether technology 
uptake would be subject to institutional constraints.  The latter situation would see the 
development of a division between those who have access to, and skills to use technologies, and 
those who have either not got access to, or cannot use them.  In both cases, the impact of the 
outcomes was considered to have a major impact upon the Council. 
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Initial construction of the scenario outlines was derived from consideration of the descriptors that 
might be applied to the ‘world’ that was defined by each of the four possible combinations of 
outcomes from these two determining cluster groupings.  The participants then allocated all of 
the previously identified driving force outcomes to one or more of the scenarios, in order to start 
building up a rich, and internally consistent picture of each of four possible futures.  After this 
stage had been reached by the full group, four sub-groups then each worked with one member of 
the facilitation team in order to build up one of the scenarios.  The smaller groups considered the 
relationships between different factors in terms of perceived cause and effect, and chronology.  
They considered the starting point of the story in relation to aspects of the present, the key events 
– decisions, developments, exercises of power by key stakeholders, etc. – that would determine 
and describe its unfolding, and the end state that would define it.  These ‘short histories of the 
future’ were designed, constructed, named and made sense of by the participants themselves, not 
by us, and were therefore the wholly owned intellectual property of the Council and its partners.  
They were not represented as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ worlds, nor were they presented as more or less 
possible than each other.  All four were seen as entirely plausible developments that were worthy 
of consideration in planning the way forward towards modernizing and joining up government 
through the adoption of new technologies.  However, each presented different challenges and 
different opportunities to the Council. 
 
The scenario titles and key identifiers are as follows:- 
• Forward to the Past – in this future, centralization dominates over dispersed and local 
governance, and central government runs the show.  There are real barriers to change, with 
restricted funding for local government, mismatches in the geographical boundaries of 
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Councils in relation to areas of wealth and employment, and a reluctance to share 
accountability across Councils and agencies.  The adoption of new technologies and the 
resultant productivity improvement in the public sector has come at the expense of local 
Councils, with a drive towards centralization at government level, and to central control or 
privatization of services at the local level.  This future may mark the beginning of the end for 
local government. 
• Free Enterprise – Here, there is emancipation of the public, and a drive away from the 
paternalism of the old-style bureaucratic governance.  The ‘customer rules’ and market forces 
are delivering – but only for some.  For those with access to, and the capability to use new 
technologies, there is a public free spirit, with ‘24x7’ access to the ‘new public sector trade’.  
Whilst there are drives towards achieving economies of scale, there is challenge to the 
concept of ‘one size fits all’, with a demand for premium services from those who can afford 
to pay extra for them.  There is, however, serious polarization in society, with exclusion from 
the new society of the underclass who can either ill-afford, or who are ill-equipped to use the 
emerging technologies 
• People’s Kailyard1 - In this scenario, there is increasing interest in the democratic process, 
but primarily at a superficial level, rather than with the fundamentals.  As such, there is a 
tendency towards seeking the ‘quick fixes’ to immediate problems, with fear of adverse 
publicity and media reaction to any perceived failure.  New technologies open up new 
channels of communication from the citizenry, and there is greater social inclusion at the 
superficial level, with public consultation processes, but a resultant move towards 
concentration upon dealing with complaints, rather than with serving needs and improving 
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services.  As such, there is reinforcement of top-down and fragmented government, lack of 
real public accountability, and an ever-increasing gap between the reality and potential for 
service effectiveness 
• Technology Serves – Here, there is a combination of technology facilitating increased access 
by the citizenry and development of a proactive form of civic governance that is based upon 
meaningful dialogue between citizens and government.  Elected members and their officers 
are enabled to act at the local level for all members of society, including the ‘invisibles’ and 
the ‘excluded’.  National government settles the subsidiarity debate in favor of local 
democracy, and supports trailblazing projects that demonstrate the competence of civic 
governance, for example in the field of social housing.  Here, the new technologies facilitate a 
new form of joined up government from the bottom up. 
 
Each of the sub-groups presented their scenario outline to the full participant group, with the key 
differences between each clearly differentiating the possibilities for a range of plausible futures.  
In ‘Forward to the Past’, there is seen a downward spiral, a vicious circle towards greater 
centralization and limited, or no local government in the future.  In ‘Free Enterprise’, local 
government is unencumbered by bureaucracy, but there is delivery of ‘premium services’ for 
those who can/will pay, but with increased polarization, disenfranchisement and fall-out in 
society.  In the ‘People’s Kailyard’, there is mediocrity and, surrounded by legislation, cross 
organizational boundary problems, non-standard protocols, etc., there is much talk of change, but 
a continuous finding of new problems to talk about, so no change.  In ‘Technology Serves’, there 
                                                                                                                                         
1 ‘Kailyard’ is an old Scots term for ‘cabbage patch’, and was selected by the participants in the sub-group to 
describe a level of minimum subsistence for members of society, despite vast amounts of expended energy. 
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is a future in which the group’s common aspirations, visions and desires for change are seen to be 
enabled. 
 
Through discussion of the underlying trends and basic driving forces that underpinned each of the 
scenarios, the Council themselves derived an initial set of key implications that were seen to be 
fundamental to their immediate thinking/acting, if they were to be effective in exerting whatever 
influence they might reasonably have over the reality of the future that will unfold over the next 5 
years.  These were:- 
• Northshire Council must lead from the front, with bold steps in developing an integrated and 
inclusive approach to technological innovation.  The dangers of the small step, and short-term 
approach were highlighted in the Kailyard scenario. 
• The Council must promote democracy in action, by making the new technologies serve the 
people, and by using technology to develop ‘civic governance’.  They must bring local 
government closer to the community level, developing high levels of ability to listen and 
respond to citizen wants and needs.  They must develop transparency and accountability in 
their deeds and actions, with policies that are meaningful to the public. 
• New technologies must be used to demonstrate the competence of local government, 
achieving public confidence and support through the provision of responsive, community 
oriented services, more customized services whilst, at the same time, applying the 
technologies to support inclusion and to reduce inequalities. 
• Northshire Council must use the new technologies in order to promote itself as the ‘home for 
sustainable value creation’. 
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• The Council must proactively promote and lobby for settlement of the subsidiarity debate in 
favor of governance at the local level. 
• Finally, in developing short-term solutions to immediate problems, the Council must watch 
out that long-term aspirations remain the guiding light. 
 
From the outcomes of the scenario project, and the resultant debate within Northshire Council on 
the above implications, there have been strategic decisions taken in support of supporting local 
democracy in action, promoting inclusion, quality and best value, and sustainability across the 
Council’s operations, fostering the concept of joined-up government, and seeking to foster the 
relationship with central government, of whatever political persuasion, whilst promoting the case 
for Northshire in the widest political and business arenas.  In addition to these strategic decisions, 
there has been operational action in seeking to establish a web-based knowledge and transaction 
system that will promote a citizen and business focused interface between new integrated service 
demand and provision by the Council and its partners, whether based upon integrated systems, or 
a ‘virtual integration’ of legacy systems. 
 
Discussion 
 
In the project undertaken with Northshire Council, participants undertook a 10-week strategic 
conversation process.  They worked primarily with their own current knowledge, but were 
supported and facilitated in challenging their thinking by introduction of external ‘expertise’, and 
by open, non-hierarchical debate in a non-threatening environment in which innovation, novelty - 
even the absurd - were seen as acceptable.  Whilst the majority of the data and knowledge input 
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to the scenario process was existent within the organization prior to the project, and had informed 
the first round submission for the Modernizing Government funding, it was held in discrete 
chunks, lacking the overall integration that would enable exploration of the widest range of 
possible and plausible outcomes.  Overcoming the lack of integrated yet divergent thinking was 
the prime aim of the project, helping organizational members to make sense of the complexities 
and ambiguities of their multiple reality worldviews.  The participants developed scenarios that 
held explicit meaning for them, at the individual and group levels, and identified implications in 
relation to their understanding of Northshire Council’s structure and service requirements.  They 
then used their own surfaced implications of these scenarios to inform analysis of current 
structure and service and to devise strategic options for further investigation and implementation.  
These informed the Council’s revised, and successful second round submission for Modernizing 
Government funding. 
 
In the project, the consideration of outcomes beyond those predicated on current options, in a 
proactive manner and without threat of immediate negative kickback, was highlighted in the 
response to the People’s Kailyard scenario.  Whilst all four scenarios were seen as plausible by 
the participants, and all contained some predetermined elements and some consideration of 
outcomes of uncertainties, it was in the Kailyard scenario that the plausibility of future outcomes 
caused critical reappraisal of current option preferences.  There was deep initial shock within the 
group to the realization that this scenario outlined a world in which the best intention of the 
Council, in seeking to push forward with quick steps to ITC implementation and increasing 
citizen access, might prove counterproductive in the longer term.  They saw a situation in which 
the Council invested in ITC in the immediate future, whilst the citizenry and business increased 
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their skills and access to technology.  These effects combined such that ease of access and free 
communication enabled the public and business to bombard the Council with inquiries, problems, 
calls for service, to which they were unable to respond, due to constraints placed upon them by a 
powerful central government.  The notion that the Council’s actions would become more and 
more PR-oriented, with quick fixes to the superficial aspects of service and long-term 
deterioration at a fundamental level, was seen as highly plausible.  It was also seen as very likely 
if decisions on rapid uptake of ITC were taken in isolation of wider and longer-term strategic 
thinking.  Within a matter of weeks following the scenario workshop, ‘the Kailyard’ had become 
a widely discussed concept within the Council offices.  There was evidence of change to 
mindsets and patterns of behavior that led to reconsideration of current ITC strategy, and to 
commitment to the project for appraisal of citizen and business focused ITC, with consideration 
of the systems for associated service delivery. 
. 
Contrary to ‘standard’ applications of decision analysis (Wright and Goodwin, 1999), 
participants in the scenario project were able to consider outcomes to driving forces in the 
environment prior to considering the strategic options for action that may be open to them.  In the 
standard approach, options for action are determined first, and considered outcomes are 
predicated upon the selected options – ‘If we do this, what might happen?’ (Wright and 
Goodwin, 1999).  We would argue that the adopted approach opened up the participants’ thinking 
to diverge beyond their previous conceptualizations of the ‘limits of the possible’, but at a stage 
when they are able to take proactive vigilant action.  That is to say, they were able to reconsider 
and redesign strategies in response to threats perceived at a theoretical level, before they were 
manifested in reality.  Where outcomes considered are limited by options that are constructed 
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early on in the process, such as in decision analysis, reactive response to the process induced, 
increased threat of unfavorable futures is likely to be defensive avoidance of the decision 
dilemma (Janis and Mann, 1977). 
 
It must be pointed out, however, that where organizations, or powerful individuals within them, 
are committed to strategies that are not seen to be robust within particular scenarios, and cannot 
be easily or conveniently changed, the results of the scenario analysis may not be the same as we 
experienced.  Hodgkinson and Wright (1997) discuss a failed scenario intervention, in which 
defensive avoidance results from the realization that there is no realistic hope to find an 
alternative option to current action. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We accept the context-specific nature of our work, with an organization stimulated by self-
interest in acquiring central government funding, and with a history of non-partisan and citizen 
oriented governance.  Also, we recognize that Northshire Council’s entry into this intervention 
process was reactive, as a result of the failure of their first stage bid for Modernizing Government 
funding.  Finally, we acknowledge that the true findings and relevance of the project require 
appraisal over the time scale of the scenarios – to the year 2005.  However, we consider that the 
following interim conclusions contribute to the debate on organizational change, particularly in 
the changing environment of the public sector as it seeks to apply private sector values, measures, 
and tools for management. 
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We would argue that the outcomes of this intervention are indicative of changed mindsets and 
behaviors derived specifically from the nature of the self-directed learning process of scenario 
development, albeit within an organization that was already committed to change, and to 
internally generated solutions to externally focused problems.  We consider, however, that this 
commitment lacked an effective vehicle for investigation and understanding of the range of 
complexities and ambiguities that were to be found within the driving forces for change.  The 
scenario process enabled the participants to surface and share their individual perceptions, 
beliefs, values, concerns etc., to structure these thematically, without reduction and exclusion, 
and to make different sets of sense of the ambiguities, the conflicts and contradictions, 
developing a shared framework within which to see different worldviews. 
 
The role of external agents as facilitators of process which, whilst new to them, involves the 
internal participants in self-managed critical reflection, learning and sense-making, is in contrast 
to the ‘normal’ management consultancy role.  In the facilitation of internally generated, 
knowledge-focused change (Cairns and Beech, 1999) the role of the external agent is not 
conceived as heroic (Kanter, 1989) deliverer of expert solutions based upon reduction and 
striving for unity.  Rather, it is seen as provider of input to actor generated solutions, supporter of 
divergent thinking, and presenter of a wider range of limits of possibility to those internal 
organizational actors.  The combination of external expertise at a general and theoretical level, 
combined with internal expertise at the particular and operational level, enabled conception and 
consideration of options that were novel, innovative, yet grounded in the ‘reality’ of Northshire.  
In this respect, we support the notion of the internal/external input as a ‘both/and’ option (Hyde, 
1999), rather than as an ‘either/or’ consideration as discussed by Schoemaker (1995).  The 
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combination of internal, organization driven investigation and idea generation supports 
generation of meaning and intellectual ownership, but is combined with external inspirational 
conceptualizations based upon surprise and novelty. 
 
Our case analysis supports the use of scenario planning as a tool for establishing the limits of 
possibility and plausibility for ‘the future’, understanding the perceived causal relationships, and 
exploring the limits of the critical uncertainties within the external environment prior to 
determination of options.  As such, scenario planning is a process-oriented tool that promotes 
dissenting opinion, encourages divergent thinking, and does not apply selection and exclusion in 
search of a causa finalis (Nietzsche, 1968); a unity of beliefs and values within the organization.  
Rather it provides a means of generating shared, causally-generated understanding of plausible 
futures, some of which may be unfavorable to the organization and its current strategic intent.  
These may, however, be used to generate shared action in support of the causa efficiens 
(Nietzsche, 1968) of organizational intent, without development of shared vision (Collins and 
Porras, 1996), organizational coherence (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991), or any other form of single 
reality unity.  This maintenance of divergence of opinion, belief, perception within an overall 
unifying frame of limits of possibility is in contrast to the reductionist unity of decision analysis, 
and the disunity - possibly fragmented nihilism - of unstructured group decision making. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
We support the use of scenario planning as a means of proactive problem-seeking vigilance.  
However, we believe that only where the scenario planning process becomes institutionalized as 
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an iterative tool for setting agendas for strategic conversation (van der Heijden, 1996), and for 
‘wind-tunneling’ the resultant scenario options, can the conflict between scenario outcomes and 
existent strategies be eliminated.  There is little chance of scenarios serving a useful function 
within a reactionary organization, with management that is locked into existent strategies by their 
own intellectual ownership (Wright and Hodgkinson, 1997).  Here, breaking the mold is the 
initial challenge. 
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 Decision Analysis Scenario Planning Unstructured Group Process 
Future orientation Decision analysis is 
conventionally undertaken 
within a singular general frame 
of the future 
Multiple frames of the future 
are constructed during the 
process 
Usually a single general frame 
of the future is unquestioned 
Structuring of 
judgmental inputs 
Quantitative decomposition into 
probabilities, payoffs and 
decision trees 
Qualitative decomposition into 
critical uncertainties and trends.  
An emphasis on understanding 
causality 
Unstructured 
Information 
orientation 
Fresh information may be 
sought if the analysis indicates 
that a recommended decision is 
sensitive to small changes in 
judgmental inputs 
“remarkable people” 
systematically provide insight 
on issues of critical uncertainty 
Unstructured 
Process orientation Focus on combining divergent 
opinions by averaging and 
reduction 
Dissenting opinion is given 
“airtime”, preserved, and 
combined with the opinions of 
others, whilst maintaining 
divergence 
Dissenting opinion may emerge 
but will be evaluated in an 
unstructured way 
Action orientation The result of the analysis is a 
single recommended decision 
for subsequent implementation 
The result is shared 
understanding of causally-
determined futures that can 
galvanize managerial action to 
avoid unfavorable futures or 
facilitate the occurrence of 
favorable ones 
Unstructured. 
 
Table 1:  Organizational Interventions and Organizational Outcomes 
